Display of Arminianism
CHAPTER 5.
WHETHER THE WILL AN
PURPOSE OF GOD MAY BE RESISTED,
AND HE BE FRUSTRATE OF HIS INTENTIONS.
By the former steps is the altar of Ahaz set on the right hand
of the altar of God,—the Arminian idol, in a direct opposition, exalted to an
equal pitch with the power and will of the Most High. I shall now present unto
you the Spirit of God once more contending with the towering imaginations of
poor mortals, about a transcendent privilege of greatness, glory, and power:
for having made his decrees mutable, his prescience fallible, and almost quite
divested him of his providence, as the sum and issue of all their endeavors,
they affirm that his will may be resisted, he may fail of his intentions, be
frustrate of his ends,—he may and doth propose such things as he neither doth
nor can at any time accomplish, and that because the execution of such acts of
his will might haply clash against the freedom of the will of men; which, if it
be not an expression of spiritual pride above all that ever the devil attempted
in heaven, divines do not well explicate that sin of his. Now, because there
may seem some difficulty in this matter, by reason of the several acceptations of
the will of God, especially in regard of that whereby it is affirmed
that his law and precepts are his will, which, alas! we all of us too often
resist or transgress, I will unfold one distinction of the will of God, which
will leave it clear what it is that the Arminians oppose, for which we count
them worthy of so heavy a charge.
“Divinum velle est ejus esse,”
say the schoolmen,[i][i] [1] “The will of God is nothing but God
willing;” not differing from his essence “secundem rem,” in the thing itself,
but only “secundem rationem,” in that it importeth a relation to the thing
willed. The essence of God, then, being a most absolute, pure, simple act or
substance, his will consequently can be but simply one; whereof we ought to
make neither division nor distinction. If that whereby it is signified were
taken always properly and strictly for the eternal will of God, the differences
hereof that are usually given are rather distinctions of the signification of
the word than of the thing.
In which regard they are not
only tolerable, but simply necessary, because without them it is utterly
impossible to reconcile some places of Scripture seemingly repugnant. In the
22d chapter of Genesis, verse 2, God commandeth Abraham to take his only son
Isaac, and offer him for a burnt-offering in the land of Moriah. Here the words
of God are declarative of some will of God unto Abraham, who knew it ought to
be, and little thought but that it should be, performed; but yet, when he
actually addressed himself to his duty, in obedience to the will of God, he
receiveth a countermand, verse 12, that he should not lay his hand upon the
child to sacrifice him. The event plainly manifesteth that it was the will of
God that Isaac should not be sacrificed; and yet notwithstanding, by reason of
his command, Abraham seems before bound to believe that it was well-pleasing
unto God that he should accomplish what he was enjoined. If the will of God in
the Scripture be used but in one acceptation, here is a plain contradiction.
Thus God commands Pharaoh to let his people go. Could Pharaoh think otherwise,
nay, was he not bound to believe that it was the will of God that he should
dismiss the Israelites at the first hearing of the message? Yet God affirms
that he would harden his heart, that he should not suffer them to depart until
he had showed his signs and wonders in the land of Egypt. To reconcile these
and the like places of Scripture, both the ancient fathers and schoolmen, with
modern divines, do affirm that the one will of God may be said to be divers or
manifold, in regard of the sundry manners whereby he willeth those things to be
done which he willeth, as also in other respects, and yet, taken in its proper
signification, is simply one and the same. The vulgar distinction of God’s
secret and revealed will is such as to which all the others may be reduced; and
therefore I have chosen it to insist upon.
The secret will of God is his
eternal, unchangeable purpose concerning all things which he hath made, to be
brought by certain means to their appointed ends: of this himself affirmeth,
that “his counsel shall stand, and he will do all his pleasure,” Isaiah 46:10.
This some call the absolute, efficacious will of God, the will of his good
pleasure, always fulfilled; and indeed this is the only proper, eternal,
constant, immutable will of God, whose order can neither be broken nor its law
transgressed, so long as with him there is neither change nor shadow of
turning.
The revealed will of God
containeth not his purpose and decree, but our duty,—not what he will do
according to his good pleasure, but what we should do if we will please him;
and this, consisting in his word, his precepts and promises, belongeth to us
and our children, that we may do the will of God. Now this, indeed, is rather to< qelhto>n than to< qe>lhma, that which God
willeth, rather than his will, but termed so as we call that the will of a man
which he hath determined shall be done: “This is the will of him that sent me,
that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting
life,” saith our Savior, John 6:40; that is, this is that which his will hath
appointed. Hence it is called “voluntas signi,” or the sign of his will,
metaphorically only called his will, saith Aquinas;[ii][ii] [2] for inasmuch as our commands are the
signs of our wills, the same is said of the precepts of God. This is the rule
of our obedience, and whose transgression makes an action sinful; for hJ aJmarti>a ejsti<n hJ ajnomi>a,
“sin is the transgression of a law,” and that such a law as is given to the
transgressor to be observed. Now, God hath not imposed on us the observation of
his eternal decree and intention; which, as it is utterly impossible for us to
transgress or frustrate, so were we unblamable if we should. A master requires
of his servant to do what he commands, not to accomplish what he intends, which
perhaps he never discovered unto him; nay, the commands of superiors are not
always signs that the commander will have the things commanded actually
performed (as in all precepts for trial), but only that they who are subjects
to this command shall be obliged to obedience, as far as the sense of it doth
extend. “Et hoc clarum est in praeceptis divinis,” saith Durand,[iii][iii] [3] etc.,—“And this is clear in the commands
of God,” by which we are obliged to do what he commandeth; and yet it is not
always his pleasure that the thing itself, in regard of the event, shall be
accomplished, as we saw before in the examples of Pharaoh and Abraham.
Now, the will of God in the
first acceptation is said to be hid or secret, not because it is so always, for
it is in some particulars revealed and made known unto us two ways:—
First, By his word; as where God
affirmeth that the dead shall rise. We doubt not but that they shall rise, and
that it is the absolute will of God that they shall do so. Secondly, By the
effects; for when any thing cometh to pass, we may cast the event on the will
of God as its cause, and look upon it as a revelation of his purpose. Jacob’s
sons little imagined that it was the will of God by them to send their brother
into Egypt; yet afterward Joseph tells them plainly it was not they, but God
that sent him thither, Genesis 45:5. But it is said to be secret for two
causes:—First, Because for the most part it is so. There is nothing in divers
issues declarative of God’s determination but only the event, which, while it
is future, is hidden to them who have faculties to judge of things past and
present, but not to discern things for to come. Hence St James bids us not be
too peremptory in our determinations that we will do this or that, not knowing
how God will close with us for its performance. Secondly, It is said to be
secret in reference to its cause, which for the most part is past our finding
out: “His path is in the great waters, and his footsteps are not known.”
It appeareth, then, that the
secret and revealed will of God are diverse in sundry respects, but chiefly in
regard of their acts and their objects. First, In regard of their acts, the
secret will of God is his eternal decree and determination concerning any thing
to be done in its appointed time; his revealed will is an act whereby he
declareth himself to love or approve any thing, whether ever it be done or no.
Secondly, They are diverse in regard of their objects. The object of God’s
purpose and decree is that which is good in any kind, with reference to its
actual existence, for it must infallibly be performed; but the object of his
revealed will is that only which is morally good (I speak of it inasmuch as it
approveth or commandeth), agreeing to the law and the gospel, and that
considered only inasmuch as it is good; for whether it be ever actually
performed or no is accidental to the object of God’s revealed will.
Now, of these two differences
the first is perpetual, in regard of their several acts; but not so the latter.
They are sometimes coincident in regard of their objects. For instance, God
commandeth us to believe; here his revealed will is that we should so do:
withal, he intendeth we shall do so; and therefore ingenerateth faith in our
hearts that we may believe. Here his secret and revealed will are coincident;
the former[iv][iv] [4] being his precept that we should believe,
the latter his purpose that we shall believe. In this case, I say, the object
of the one and the other is the same,—even what we ought to do, and what he
will do. And this inasmuch as he hath “wrought all our works in us,” Isaiah
26:12. They are our own works which he works in us; his act in us and by us is
ofttimes our duty towards him. He commands us by his revealed will to walk in
his statutes, and keep his laws; upon this he also promiseth that he will so
effect all things, that of some this shall be performed: Ezekiel 36:26, 27, “A
new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you: and I
will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an heart
of flesh. And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my
statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments and do them.” So that the self-same obedience
of the people of God is here the object of his will, taken in either
acceptation. And yet the precept of God is not here, as some learned men
suppose, declarative of God’s intention, for then it must be so to all to whom
it is given; which evidently it is not, for many are commanded to believe on
whom God never bestoweth faith. It is still to be looked upon as a mere
declaration of our duty, its closing with God’s intention being accidental unto
it. There is a wide difference betwixt “Do such a thing,” and, “You shall do
it.” If God’s command to Judas to believe imported as much as, “It is my
purpose and intention that Judas shall believe,” it must needs contradict that
will of God whereby he determined that Judas, for his infidelity, should go to
his “own place.” His precepts are in all obedience of us to be performed, but
do not signify his will that we shall actually fulfill his commands. Abraham
was not bound to believe that it was God’s intention that Isaac should be
sacrificed, but that it was his duty. There was no obligation on Pharaoh to
think it was God’s purpose the people should depart at the first summons; he
had nothing to do with that: but there was one to believe that if he would
please God, he must let them go. Hence divers things of good use in these
controversies may be collected:—
First, That God may command many
things by his word which he never decreed that they should actually be
performed; because, in such things, his words are not a revelation of his
eternal decree and purpose, but only a declaration of some thing wherewith he
is well-pleased, be it by us performed or no. In the fore-cited case he
commanded Pharaoh to let his people go, and plagued him for refusing to obey
his command. Hence we may not collect that God intended the obedience and
conversion of Pharaoh by this his precept, but was frustrated of his
intention,—for the Scripture is evident and clear that God purposed by his
disobedience to accomplish an end far different, even a manifestation of his
glory by his punishment,—but only that obedience unto his commands is pleasing
unto him; as 1 Samuel 15:22.
Secondly, That the will of God
to which our obedience is required is the revealed will of God contained in his
word; whose compliance with his decree is such, that hence we learn three
things tending to the execution of it:—First, That it is the condition of the
word of God, and the dispensation thereof, instantly to persuade to faith and
obedience. Secondly, That it is our duty by all means to aspire to the
performance of all things by it enjoined, and our fault if we do not. Thirdly,
That God by these means will accomplish his eternal decree of saving his elect;
and that he willeth the salvation of others, inasmuch as he calleth them unto
the performance of the condition thereof. Now, our obedience is so to be
regulated by this revealed will of God, that we may sin either by omission
against its precepts or commission against its prohibitions; although by our so
omitting or committing of any thing the secret will or purpose of God be
fulfilled. Had Abraham disobeyed God’s precept, when he was commanded to
sacrifice his son Isaac, though God’s will had been accomplished thereby, who
never intended it, yet Abraham had grievously sinned against the revealed will
of God, the rule of his duty. The holiness of our actions consisteth in a
conformity unto his precepts, and not unto his purposes. On this ground Gregory
affirmeth,[v][v] [5] “That many fulfill the will of God” (that
is, his intentions) “when they think to change it” (by transgressing his
precepts); “and by resisting imprudently, obey God’s purpose.” And to show how
merely we in our actions are tied to this rule of our duty, St Austin[vi][vi] [6] shows how a man may do good in a thing
cross to God’s secret will, and evil in that which complieth with it, which he
illustrates by the example of a sick parent having two children, the one
wicked, who desires his father’s death, the other godly, and he prays for his
life. But the will of God is he shall die, agreeably to the desire of the
wicked child; and yet it is the other who hath performed his duty, and done
what is pleasing unto God.
Thirdly, To return from this not
unnecessary digression, that which we have now in agitation is the secret will
of God, which we have before unfolded; and this it is that we charge the
Arminians for affirming that it may be resisted,—that is, that God may fail
in his purposes, come short of what he earnestly intendeth, or be frustrated of
his aim and end: as if, [when] he should determinately resolve the faith
and salvation of any man, it is in the power of that man to make void his
determination, and not believe, and not be saved. Now, it is only in cases of
this nature, wherein our own free wills have an interest, that they thus limit
and circumscribe the power of the Most High. In other things they grant
his omnipotence to be of no less extent than others do; but in this case
they are peremptory and resolute, without any coloring or tergiversation: for
whereas there is a question proposed by the apostle, Romans 9:19, “Who hath
resisted his will?” which that none hath or can he grants in the following
verses, Corvinus affirms, [vii][vii] [7] “It is only an objection of the Jews,
rejected by the apostle;”—which is much like an answer young scholars usually
give to some difficult place in Aristotle, when they cannot think of a better,
“Loquitur ex aliorum sententia;” for there is no sign of any such rejection of
it by the apostle in the whole following discourse; yea, and it is not the Jews
that St Paul disputeth withal here, but weaker brethren concerning the Jews,
which is manifest from the first verse of the next chapter, where he
distinguisheth between “brethren” to whom and “Israel” of whom he spake.
Secondly, He speaks of the Jews in the whole treatise in the third person, but
of the disputer in the second. Thirdly, It is taken for a confessed principle
between St Paul and the disputer, as he calls him, that the Jews were rejected,
which surely themselves would not readily acknowledge. So that Corvinus
rejects, as an objection of the Jews, a granted principle of St Paul and the
other Christians of his time. With the like confidence the same author
affirmeth, [viii][viii] [8] “That they nothing doubt but that many
things are not done which God would have to be done.” Vorstius goes farther,
teaching [ix][ix] [9] “that not only many things are[not] done
which he would have done, but also that many things are done which he would not
have done.” He means not our transgressing of his law, but God’s failing in his
purpose, as Corvinus clears it, acknowledging that the execution of God’s will
is suspended or hindered by man; to whom Episcopius subscribes.[x][x] [10] As, for example, God purposeth and
intendeth the conversion of a sinner,—suppose it were Mary Magdalene;—can this
intention of his be crossed and his will resisted? “Yea,” say the Arminians,
“for God converts sinners by his grace.” “But we can resist God when he would
convert us by his grace,”[xi][xi] [11] say six of them jointly in their meeting
at the Hague. “But some one may here object,” say they, “that thus God faileth
of his intention, doth not attain the end at which he aims. We answer, This we
grant.” Or be it the salvation of men, they say, [xii][xii] [12] “they are certain that God intendeth
that for many which never obtain it;” that end he cannot compass.
And here, methinks, they place
God in a most unhappy condition, by affirming that they are often damned whom
he would have to be saved, though he desires their salvation with a most
vehement desire and natural affection,[xiii][xiii] [13] —such,
I think, as crows have to the good of their young ones: for that there are in
him such desires as are never fulfilled,[xiv][xiv] [14] because not regulated by wisdom and
justice, they plainly affirm; for although by his infinite power, perhaps, he
might accomplish them, yet it would not become him so to do.
Now, let any good-natured man,
who hath been a little troubled for poor Jupiter in Homer, mourning for the
death of his son Sarpedon, which he could not prevent, or hath been grieved for
the sorrow of a distressed father, not able to remove the wickedness and
inevitable ruin of an only son, drop one tear for the restrained condition of
the God of heaven, who, when he would have all and every man in the world to
come to heaven, to escape the torments of hell, and that with a serious purpose
and intention that it shall be so, a vehement affection and fervent natural
desire that it should be so, yet, being not in himself alone able to save one,
must be forced to lose his desire, lay down his affection, change his purpose,
and see the greatest part of them to perish everlastingly,[xv][xv] [15] yea, notwithstanding that he had
provided a sufficient means for them all to escape, with a purpose and
intention that they should so do.
In brief, their whole doctrine
on this point is laid down by Corvinus, chapter 3, against Moulin, and the
third section; where, first, he alloweth of the distinction of the will of God
into that whereby he will have us do something, and that whereby he will do
any thing himself. The first is nothing but his law and precepts; which we
with him affirm may be said to be resisted, inasmuch as it is transgressed. The
latter, he saith, if it respect any act of man’s, may be considered as
preceding that act, or following it; if preceding it, then it may be resisted,
if man will not cooperate. Now, this is the will of God, whereby himself
intendeth to do any thing; the sum of which distinction is this, “The will of
God concerning the future being of any thing may be considered as it goeth
before the actual existence of the thing itself, and in this regard it may be
hindered or resisted; but as it is considered to follow any act of man, it is
always fulfilled:” by which latter member, striving to mollify the harshness of
the former, he runs himself into inexplicable nonsense, affirming that that act
of the will of God whereby he intendeth men shall do any thing cannot be
hindered after they have done it,—that is, God hath irresistibly purposed they
shall do it, provided they do it! In his following discourse, also, he plainly
grants that there is no act of God’s will about the salvation of men that may
not be made void and of none effect, but only that general decree whereby he
hath established an inseparable connection between faith and salvation, or
whereby he hath appointed faith in Christ to be the means of attaining
blessedness, which is only an immanent act of God’s will, producing no outward
effect; so that every act thereof that hath an external issue by human co-operation
is frustrable and may fall to the ground: which in what direct opposition it
stands to the word of God, let these following instances declare:—
First, “Our God is in the
heavens,” saith the psalmist: “he hath done whatsoever he hath pleased,” Psalm
115:3. Not only part, but all, whatsoever he pleased should come to pass, by
any means. “He ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he
will,” Daniel 4:17. The transposition of kingdoms is not without the mixture of
divers free and voluntary actions of men, and yet in that great work God doth
all that he pleaseth. Yea, before him “all the inhabitants of the earth are
reputed as nothing: and he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven,
and among the inhabitants of the earth: and none can stay his hand, or say unto
him, What doest thou?” verse 35. “My counsel,” saith he, “shall stand, and I
will do all my pleasure,” Isaiah 46:10; “I have purposed, I will also do it,”
verse 11. Nay, so certain is he of accomplishing all his purposes, that he
confirms it with an oath: “The LORD of hosts hath sworn, Surely as I have
thought, so it shall come to pass; and as I have purposed, so shall it stand,”
Isaiah 14:24. And indeed it were a very strange thing, that God should intend
what he foreseeth will never come to pass. But I confess this argument will not
be pressing against the Arminians, who question that prescience; but yet, would
they also would observe from the Scripture, that the failing of wicked men’s
counsels and intentions is a thing that God is said to “deride in heaven,” as
Psalm 2:4. He threatens them with it. “Take counsel together,” saith he, “and
it shall come to nought; speak the word, and it shall not stand,” Isaiah 8:10.
See also chapter 29:7,8. And shall they be enabled to recriminate, and cast the
like aspersion on the God of heaven? No, surely. Saith St Austin,[xvi][xvi] [16] “Let us take heed we be not compelled to
believe that Almighty God would have any thing done which doth not come to
pass.” To which truth, also, that the schoolmen have universally consented is
showed by Alvarez, Disput. 32, pro. 3. And these few instances will manifest
the Arminian opposition to the word of God in this particular:—
S.S. |
Lib. Arbit. |
“Our
God is in the heavens: he hath done whatsoever he hath pleased,” Psalm 115:3. |
“We
nothing doubt but many things which God willeth, or that it pleaseth him to
have done, do yet never come to pass,” Corvinus. “We grant that some of God’s
desires are never fulfilled,” Idem. |
“I
will do all my pleasure.” Isaiah 46:10. “None can stay his hand, or say unto
him, What doest thou?” Daniel 4:35. |
“It
is in the power of man to hinder the execution of God’s will,” Idem. |
“I
have purposed, I will also o it,” Isaiah 46:11. |
“It
is ridiculous to imagine that God doth not seriously will any thing but what
taketh effect,” Episcopius. |
“As
I have purposed, so shall it stand,” Isaiah 14:24. |
“It
may be objected that God faileth of his end: this we readily grant,” Rem.
Synod. |
ENDNOTES:
[xvii][xvii] [1] Aquin., p. q. 19, ar. ad. 1.
[xviii][xviii] [2] Aquin., q. g. 19, a. 11, c.
[xix][xix] [3] Durand, Dist. c. 48, q. 3.
[xx][xx] [4] The words “former” and “latter”
evidently refer to the previous sentence,—“former” corresponding with the
revealed will, “latter” with the secret will of God. The order is reversed in
the first clause of this sentence, and hence the author’s meaning might be
mistaken.—ED.
[xxi][xxi] [5] “Multi voluntatem Del faciunt, cum illam
nituntur vitare, et resistendo impruden-ter obsequuntur divino consilio.”—Greg.
Moral., lib. 6. cap. 11.
[xxii][xxii] [6] Aug. Enchirid. ad Lauren., cap.
101.
[xxiii][xxiii] [7] “Ea sententia non continet apostoli
verba, sed Judseorum objectionem ab apostolo rejectam.”—Corv, ad Molin., cap.
3. per. 19.
[xxiv][xxiv] [8] “Multa non fieri quae Deus fieri
vult, vel non dubitamus.”—Ibid, cap. 5:p. 5.
[xxv][xxv] [9] “Multa fiunt quae Deus fieri non
vult: nec semper fiunt quae ipse fiere vult.”—Vorst. de Deo, p. 64.
[xxvi][xxvi] [10] “Ab homine esse agnoscimus, quod
voluntatis (divinae) executio saepe suspendatur.”—Corv., ubi sup. parag. 12;
Episcop. Disput. Pri. De Volun. Dei, corol. 5.
[xxvii][xxvii] [11] “Possumus Deo resistere, cum nos
vult per gratiam suam convertere.”—Rem. Coll. Hag., p. 193. “Objiciet quis,
ergo illum suum finem Deus non est assecutus, respon-demus, nos hoc
concedere.”—Rem. Defens. Sent. in Synod., p. 256.
[xxviii][xxviii] [12] “Nobis certum est, Deum multorum
salutem intendere, in quibus eam non assequitur.”—Grevinch, ad Ames., p. 271.
[xxix][xxix] [13] “Vehemens est in Deo affectus ad
homini benefaciendum.”—Corv, ad Molin., cap. 5. sect. 8.
[xxx][xxx] [14] “Esse in Deo desideria quae non
implentur concedimus.”—Idem, sect. 9. “Non decet ut Deus infinita sua potentia
utatur ad id efficiendum, quo desiderio suo naturali fertur.”—Armim Antip., p.
584.
[xxxi][xxxi] [15] “Deus eo fine et intentione
remedium praeparavit, ut omnes ejus actu fierent participes, quamvis id non
actu evenit.”—Rem. Apol., cap. 7. fol. 86.
[xxxii][xxxii] [16] “Ne credere cogamur aliquid
omnipotentem Deum voluisse factumque non esse.”—Aug. En., cap. 103.