Display of Arminianism
CHAPTER 3.
OF THE PRESCIENCE OR
FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD, AND HOW
IT IS QUESTIONED AND OVERTHROWN BY THE ARMINIANS.
The prescience or foreknowledge of God hath not hitherto,
in express terms, been denied by the Arminians, but only questioned and
overthrown by consequence, inasmuch as they deny the certainty and
unchangeableness of his decrees, on which it is founded. It is not a
foreknowledge of all or any thing which they oppose, but only of things free
and contingent, and that only to comply with their formerly-exploded error,
that the purposes of God concerning such things are temporal and mutable; which
obstacle being once removed, the way is open how to ascribe the presidentship
of all human actions to omnipotent contingency, and her sire free-will. Now, we
call that contingent which, in regard of its next and immediate cause, before
it come to pass, may be done or may be not done; as, that a man shall do such a
thing tomorrow, or any time hereafter, which he may choose whether ever he will
do or no. Such things as these are free and changeable, in respect of men,
their immediate and second causes; but if we, as we ought to do, (James
4:13-15.) look up unto Him who foreseeth and hath ordained the event of them or
their omission, they may be said necessarily to come to pass or to be omitted.
It could not be but as it was. Christians hitherto, yea, and heathens,[i][i] [1] in all things of this nature, have usually, upon
their event, reflected on God as one whose determination was passed on them
from eternity, and who knew them long before; as the killing of men by the fall
of a house, who might, in respect of the freedom of their own wills, have not
been there. Or if a man fall into the hands of thieves, we presently conclude
it was the will of God. It must be so; he knew it before.
Divines, for distinction’s
sake, [ii][ii] [2] ascribe unto God a twofold knowledge; one,
intuitive or intellective, whereby he foreknoweth and seeth all things that are
possible,—that is, all things that can be done by his almighty power,—without
any respect to their future existence, whether they shall come to pass or no.
Yea, infinite things, whose actual being eternity shall never behold, are thus
open and naked unto him; for was there not strength and power in his hand to
have created another world? was there not counsel in the storehouse of his
wisdom to have created this otherwise, or not to have created it at all? Shall
we say that his providence extends itself every way to the utmost of its
activity? or can he not produce innumerable things in the world which now he
doth not. Now, all these, and every thing else that is feasible to his infinite
power, he foresees and knows, “scientia,” as they speak, “simplicis
intelligentiae,” by his essential knowledge.
Out [iii][iii] [3] of this large and boundless territory of things
possible, God by his decrees freely determineth what shall come to pass, and
makes them future which before were but possible. After this decree, as they
commonly speak, followeth, or together with it, as [iv][iv] [4] others more exactly, taketh place, that prescience
of God which they call “visionis,” “of vision,” [v][v] [5] whereby he infallibly seeth all things in their
proper causes, and how and when they shall come to pass. Now, these two sorts
of knowledge differ, [vi][vi] [6] inasmuch as by the one God knoweth what it is
possible may come to pass; by the other, only what it is impossible should not
come to pass. Things are possible in regard of God’s power, future in regard of
his decree. So that (if I may so say) the measure of the first kind of science
is God’s omnipotency, what he can do; of the other his purpose, what certainly
he will do, or permit to be done. With this prescience, then, God foreseeth
all, and nothing but what he hath decreed shall come to pass.
For every thing to be produced
next and under him, [vii][vii] [7] God hath prepared divers and several kinds of
causes, diversely operative in producing their effects, some whereof are said
to work necessarily, the institution of their nature being to do as they do,
and not otherwise; so the sun giveth light, and the fire heat. And yet, in some
regard, their effects and products may be said to be contingent and free,
inasmuch as the concurrence of God, the first cause, is required to their
operation, who doth all things most freely, according to the counsel of his
will. Thus the sun stood still in the time of Joshua, and the fire burned not
the three children; but ordinarily such agents working “necessitate naturae,”
their effects are said to be necessary. Secondly, To some things God hath
fitted free and contingent causes, which either apply themselves to operation
in particular, according to election, choosing to do this thing rather than that;
as angels and men, in their free and deliberate actions, which they so perform
as that they could have not done them;—or else they produce effects to< sumbebhko>v, merely by
accident, and the operation of such things we say to be casual; as if a hatchet,
falling out of the hand of a man cutting down a tree, should kill another whom
he never saw. Now, nothing in either of these ways comes to pass but God hath
determined it, both for the matter and manner, [viii][viii] [8] even so as is agreeable to their causes,—some
necessarily, some freely, some casually or contingently, yet also, as having a
certain futurition from his decree, he infallibly foreseeth that they shall so
come to pass. But yet that he doth so in respect of things free and contingent
is much questioned by the Arminians in express terms, and denied by consequence,
notwithstanding St Jerome affirmeth [ix][ix] [9] that so to do is destructive to the very essence
of the Deity.
First, Their doctrine of the
mutability of God’s decrees, on whose firmness is founded the infallibility of
this prescience, doth quite overthrow it. God thus foreknowing only what he
hath so decreed shall come to pass, if that be no firmer settled but that it
may[be] and is often altered, according to the divers inclinations of men’s
wills, which I showed before they affirm, he can have at best but a conjectural
foreknowledge of what is yet for to come, not founded on his own unchangeable
purpose, but upon a guess at the free inclination of men’s wills. For
instance, [x][x] [10] God willeth that all men should be saved. This
act of his will, according to the Arminian doctrine, is his conditionate decree
to save all men if they will believe. Well, among these is Judas, as [xi][xi] [11] equal a sharer in the benefit of this decree as
Peter. God, then, will have him to be saved, and to this end allows him all
those means which are necessary to beget faith in him, and are every way
sufficient to that purpose, and do produce that effect in others; what can God
foresee, then, but that Judas as well as Peter will believe? He intendeth he
should, he hath determined nothing to the contrary. Let him come, then, and act
his own part. Why, he proves so obstinately malicious, [xii][xii] [12] that God, with all his omnipotency, as they
speak, by any way that becomes him, which must not be by any irresistible
efficacy, cannot change his obdurate heart. Well, then, he determineth,
according to the exigence of his justice, that he shall be damned for his
impenitency, and foreseeth that accordingly. But now, suppose this wretch, even
at his last moment, should bethink himself and return to the Lord, which in
their conceit he may, notwithstanding his former reprobation (which, [xiii][xiii] [13] as they state it, seems a great act of
mercy), [xiv][xiv] [14] God must keep to the rules of his justice, and
elect or determine to save him; by which the varlet hath twice or thrice
deceived his expectation.
Secondly, [xv][xv] [15] They affirm that God is said properly to expect
and desire divers things which yet never come to pass. “We grant,” saith
Corvinus, “that there are desires in God that never are fulfilled.” Now,
surely, to desire what one is sure will never come to pass is not an act
regulated by wisdom or counsel; and, therefore, they must grant that before he
did not know but perhaps so it might be. “God wisheth and desireth some good
things, which yet come not to pass,”[xvi][xvi] [16] say they, in their Confession; whence one of
these two things must needs follow,—either, first, that there is a great deal
of imperfection in his nature, to desire and expect what he knows shall never
come to pass; or else he did not know but it might, which overthrows his
prescience. Yea, and say they expressly, [xvii][xvii] [17] “That the hope and expectation of God is deceived
by man;” and confess, “that the strength of their strongest argument lies in
this, that God hoped and expected obedience from Israel.” Secondly, That he
complaineth that his hope is deluded, which, being taken properly, and as they
urge it, cannot consist with his eternal prescience; for they disesteem the
usual answer of divines, that hope, expectation, and such like passions, which
include in them any imperfection, are ascribed unto God per ajnqrwpopa>qeian,—in regard of that
analogy his actions hold with such of ours as we perform having those passions.
Thirdly, [xviii][xviii] [18] They teach that God hath determined nothing
concerning such things as these in question. “That God hath determined future
contingent things unto either part (I mean such as issue from the free-will of
the creature), I abominate, hate, and curse, as false, absurd, and leading us
on unto blasphemy,” saith Arminius. To determine of them to either part is to
determine and ordain whether they shall be, or whether they shall not be; as,
that David shall or shall not go up tomorrow against the Philistines, and
prevail. Now, the infallibility of God’s foreknowing of such things depending
on the certainty of his decree and determination, if there be no such thing as
this, that also must needs fall to the ground.
Fourthly, [xix][xix] [19] See what positively they write concerning this
everlasting foreknowledge of God:—First, They call it a troublesome question;
secondly, They make it a thing disputable whether there be any such thing or
no; and though haply it may be ascribed unto God, yet, thirdly, They think it
no motive to the worship of him; fourthly, They say, better it were quite
exploded, because the difficulties that attend it can scarcely be reconciled with
man’s liberty, God’s threatenings and promises; yea, fifthly, It seems rather
to be invented to crucify poor mortals than to be of any moment in religion. So
Episcopius. It may be excepted that this is but one doctor’s opinion. It is
true, they are one man’s words; but the thing itself is countenanced by the
whole sect. As, first, in the large prolix declaration of their opinions, they
speak not one word of it; and being taxed for this omission by the professors
of Leyden, they vindicate themselves so coldly in their Apology, that some
learned men do from hence conclude,[xx][xx] [20] that certainly, in their most secret judgments,
all the Arminians do consent with Socinus in ascribing unto God only a
conjectural foreknowledge. And one great prophet of their own affirms
roundly, [xxi][xxi] [21] “That God, after his manner, oftentimes feareth,
that is, suspecteth, and that not without cause, and prudently conjectureth,
that this or that evil may arise,” Vorstius. And their chiefest
patriarchs, [xxii][xxii] [22] “That God doth often intend what he doth not
foresee will come to pass,” Armin., Corv. Now, whether this kind of atheism be
tolerable among Christians or no, let all men judge who have their senses
exercised in the word of God; which, I am sure, teaches us another lesson.
For,—
First, It is laid down as
a firm foundation, that “known unto God are all his works from the beginning of
the world,” Acts 15:18. Every thing, then, that in any respect may be called
his work, is known unto him from all eternity. Now, what in the world, if we
may speak as he hath taught us, can be exempted from this denomination? Even
actions in themselves sinful are not; though not as sinful, yet in some other
regard, as punishments of others. “Behold,” saith Nathan to David, in the name
of God, “I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy
neighbor, and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this sun; for thou
didst it secretly, but I will do this thing before all Israel,” 2 Samuel
12:11,12. So, also, when wicked robbers had nefariously spoiled Job of all his
substance, the holy man concludeth, “The LORD gave, and the LORD hath taken
away,” Job 1:21. Now, if the working of God’s providence be so mighty and
effectual, even in and over those actions wherein the devil and men do most
maliciously offend, as did Absalom and the Sabean with the Chaldean thieves,
that it may be said to be his work, and he may be said to “do it” (I crave
liberty to use the Scripture phrase), then certainly nothing in the world, in
some respect or other, is independent of his all-disposing hand; yea, Judas
himself betraying our Savior did nothing but “what his hand and counsel
determined before should be done,”[xxiii][xxiii] [23] Acts 4:28, in respect of the event of the thing
itself. And if these actions, notwithstanding these two hindrances,—first, that
they were contingent, wrought by free agents, working according to election and
choice; secondly, that they were sinful and wicked in the agents,—had yet their
dependence on his purpose and determinate counsel, surely he hath an interest
of operation in the acts of every creature. But his works, as it appears
before, are all known unto him from the beginning, for he worketh nothing by
chance or accidentally, but all things determinately, according to his own
decree, or “the counsel of his own will,” Ephesians 1:11.
Secondly, The manner of
God’s knowing of things doth evidently show that nothing that is, or may be,
can be hid from him; [xxiv][xxiv] [24] which is not by discourse and collection of one
thing out of another, conclusions out of principles, but altogether and at
once, evidently, clearly, and distinctly, both in respect tou~ o[ti, and tou~ dio>ti. By one most pure act of his own essence he
discerneth all things: for there is “no creature that is not manifest in his
sight, but all are naked and opened unto his eyes,” Hebrews 4:13. So that those
things concerning which we treat [xxv][xxv] [25] he knoweth three ways:—First, In himself and his
own decree, as the first cause; in which respect they may be said to be
necessary, in respect of the certainty of their event. Secondly, In their
immediate causes, wherein their contingency doth properly consist. Thirdly, In
their own nature as future, but to his infinite knowledge ever present.
Thirdly, The Scripture
(Psalm 44:21; Job 11:11; Daniel 2:47; Psalm 7:9, 26:2, 147:4; Luke 2:27;
Matthew 10:29, 30; Psalm 139:2) is full of expressions to this purpose,—to wit,
“That God knoweth all secrets, and revealeth hidden things: he searcheth the
reins and the heart: he knoweth the number of the stars, and the birds of the
air, the lilies of the field, the falling of sparrows, the number of the hairs
of our heads.” Some places are most remarkable, as that of the Psalmist, “He
knoweth my thoughts long before;” even before ever they come into our minds,
before their first rising. And yet many actions that are most contingent depend
upon those thoughts known unto God from eternity; nay,—which breaketh the very
neck of the goddess contingency,—those things wherein her greatest power is
imagined to consist are directly ascribed unto God, as our words, “the answer
of the tongue,” Proverbs 16:1; and the directing of an arrow, shot by chance,
to a mark not aimed at, 1 Kings 22:34. Surely God must needs foreknow the event
of that contingent action; he must needs know the man would so shoot who had
determined his arrow should be the death of a king. He maketh men poor and
rich, Proverbs 22:2; He lifteth up one, and pulleth down another, Psalm 75:7.
How many contingencies did gorgo<n
o]mma tou~ despo>tou, his piercing eye run through to foresee the
crowning of Esther for the deliverance of his people! In a word, “Known unto
God are all his works.” Now, what can possibly be imagined to be more
contingent than the killing of a man by the fall of an axe from out of his hand
who intended no such thing? Yet this God assumeth as his own work, Deuteronomy
19:5, Exodus 21:13; and so surely was by him foreknown.
Fourthly, Do but consider
the prophecies in Scripture, especially those concerning our Savior, how many
free and contingent actions did concur for the fulfilling of them; as Isaiah
7:14, 9:6,53; Genesis 3:15, etc. The like may be said of other predictions; as
of the wasting of Jerusalem by the Babylonians, which though, in regard of
God’s prescience, it was certainly to come to pass, yet they did it most
freely, not only following the counsel of their own wills, but also using
divination, or chanceable lots, for their direction, Ezekiel 21:21. Yet he who
made the eye seeth all these things, Psalm 94:9.
Divers other reasons and
testimonies might be produced to confirm our doctrine of God’s everlasting
prescience; which, notwithstanding Episcopius’ blasphemy, that it serves for
nought but to cruciate poor mortals, we believe to be a good part of the
foundation of all that consolation which God is pleased to afford us in this
vale of tears. Amidst all our afflictions and temptations, under whose pressure
we should else faint and despair, it is no small comfort to be assured that we
do nor can suffer nothing but what his hand and counsel guides unto us, what is
open and naked before his eyes, and whose end and issue he knoweth long before;
which is a strong motive to patience, a sure anchor of hope, a firm ground of
consolation. Now, to present in one view how opposite the opinions of the
worshippers of the great goddess contingency are to this sacred truth, take
this short antithesis:—
S.S.
|
Lib. Arbit.
|
“Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of
the world,” Acts 15:18.
|
“God sometimes feareth, and prudently conjectureth, that
this or that evil may arise,” Vorsti.
|
“Neither is there any creature that is not manifest in
his sight: but all things are naked and opened unto the eyes of him with whom
we have to do,” Hebrews 4:13.
|
“God doth not always foresee the event of what he
intendeth,” Corvin. ad Mol.
|
“He that formed the eye, shall he not see?” Psalm 94:9.
“When a man goeth into the wood with his neighbor to hew wood, and his hand fetcheth
a stroke with the axe to cut down the tree, and the head slippeth from the
helve, and lighteth upon his neighbor, that he die,” Deuteronomy 19:5. “God
delivers him into his hand,” Exodus 21:13.
|
“Future contingencies are not determined unto either
part,” Armin. That is, God hath not determined, and so, consequently, doth
not foreknow, whether they shall come to pass or no.
|
“Take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What
shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? for your heavenly Father
knoweth that ye have need of all these things,” Matthew 6:31,32.
|
“God hopeth and expecteth divers things that shall never
come to pass,” Rem. “Take away God’s prescience and you overthrow his deity,”
Jerome. “The doctrine of prescience seems to be invented only to vex and
cruciate poor mortal men,” Episcop.
|
ENDNOTES:
[xxvi][xxvi] [1] Dio<v
d j otelei>eto boulh>, Hom;—“God’s will was done.”
[xxvii][xxvii] [2] “Quaecunque possunt per creaturam fieri, vel
cogitari, vel dici, et etiam quaecunque ipse facere potest, omnia cognoscit
Deus, etiamsi neque sunt, neque erunt, neque fuerunt, scientia simplicis
intelligentiae.”—Aquin, p. q. 14, a. 9, c. Ex verbis apostoli, Romans 3, “Qui
vocat ea quae non sunt tanquam ea quae sunt.” Sic scholastici omnes. Fer.
Scholast. Orthod. Speci. cap. in., alii passim. Vid. Hieron. Zanch. De Scientia
Dei, lib. diatrib. 3., cap. 2, q. 5.
[xxviii][xxviii] [3] Vid. Sam. Rhaetorfort. Exercit. de Grat.,
ex. 1. cap. 4.
[xxix][xxix] [4] “Res ipsae nullo naturae momento possibiles
esse dicendae sunt priusquam a Deo in-telliguntur, scientia quae dicitur
simplicis intelligentiae, ita etiam scientia quae dicitur visionis, et fertur
in res futuras, nullo naturae momento, posterior statuenda videtur, ista
futuritione, rerum; cum scientia,” etc.—Dr Twiss. ad Errat. Vind. Grat.
[xxx][xxx] [5] “Scientia visionis dicitur, quia ea quae
videntur, apud nos habent esse distinctum extra videntem.”—Aq. p. q. 14, a. 9,
c.
[xxxi][xxxi] [6] “In eo differt praescientia intuitionis, ab
ea, quae approbationis est, quod illa praesciat, quod evenire possibile est;
hoc vero quod impossibile est non evenire.”—Ferrius. Orthod. Scholast. Spoci.
cap. 23. Caeterum posterior ista scientia non proprie dicitur a Ferrio scientia
approbationis, illa enim est, qua Deus dicitur nosse quae amat et ap-probat; ab
utraque altera distincta. Matthew 7:23; Romans 11:2; 2 Timothy 2:19. “Quamvis
infinitorum numerorum, nullus sit numerus, non tamen est incomprehensibilis ei,
cujus scientiae non est numerus.”—Aug. de Civit. Dei, lib. 12. cap. 18.
[xxxii][xxxii] [7] “Quibusdam effectibus praeparavit causas
necessarias, ut necessario eveniret, quibus-dam vero causas contingentes ut
evenirent contingenter, secundum conditionem proximarum causarum.”—Aquin. p. q.
28, a. 4, in Cor. Zanch. de Natur. Dei, lib. v., qu. 4, thes.
[xxxiii][xxxiii] [8] “Res et modos rerum”—Aquin.
[xxxiv][xxxiv] [9] “Cui praescientiam tollis, aufers
divinitatem.”—Hieron. ad Pelag., lib.
[xxxv][xxxv] [10] “Deus ita omnium salutem ex aequo vult, ut
illam ex aequo optet et desideret.”—Corv. ad Molin., cap. 31. sect. 1
[xxxvi][xxxvi] [11] “Talis gratia omnibus datur quae sufficiat
ad fidem generandam.”—Idem, ibid, sect. 15.
[xxxvii][xxxvii] [12] “Pertinaci quorundam malitia
compulsus.”—Armin., ubi sup.
[xxxviii][xxxviii] [13] “Reprobatio populi Judaici fuit actio
temporaria et quae bono ipsorum Judaeorum si modo sanabiles adhuc essent,
animumque advertere vellent, servire poterat, utque ei fini serviret a Deo facta
erat.”—Rem. Apol., cap. 20. p. 221.
[xxxix][xxxix] [14] “Injustum est apud Deum vel non credentem
eligere, vel credentem non eligere.”—Rem. Apol.
[xl][xl] [15] “Concedimus in Deo desideria, quae nunquam
implentur.”—Corv. Ad Molin., cap. v. sect. 2.
[xli][xli] [16] “Bona quaedam Deus optat et
desiderat.”—Rem. Confes., cap. 2. sect. 9.
[xlii][xlii] [17] “Dei spes et expectatio est ab hominibus
elusa.”—Rem. Scrip. Syn. in cap. v., Isaiah 5:1. “In eo vis argumenti est, quod
Deus ab Israele obedientiam et sperarit, et expectarit.”—Idem, ibid. “Quod Deus
de elusa spe sua conqueratur.”—Idem, ubi supra.
[xliii][xliii] [18] “Deum futura contingentia, decreto suo
determinasse ad alterutram partem (intellige quae a libera creaturae voluntate
patrantur), falsum, absurdum, et multiplicis blasphemiae praevium abominor et
exsecror.”—Armin. Declarat. Senten.
[xliv][xliv] [19] “Disquiri permittimus:—1. Operosam illam
quaestionem, de scientia futurorum contingentium absoluta et conditionata; 2.
Etsi non negemus Deo illam scientiam attribui posse; 3. Tamen an necessarium
saluti sit ad hoc ut Deus recte colatur examinari permittimus; 4. Tum merito
facessere debent a scholis et ecclesiis, intricatae et spinosae istae
quaestiones quae de ea agitari solent,—quomodo illa cum libertate arbitrii, cum
seriis Dei comminationibus, aliisque actionibus, consistere possit: quae omnia
crucem potius miseris mortalibus fixerunt, quam ad religionem cultumque
divinum, momenti aliquid inquisitoribus suis attulerunt.”—Episcopius, Disput.
4. sect. 10.; Rem. Apol., pp. 43,44.
[xlv][xlv] [20] Ames. Antisynod, p. 10.
[xlvi][xlvi] [21] “Deus suo modo aliquando metuit, hoc est,
merito suspicatur et prudenter conjicit, hoc vel illud malum oriturum.”—Vorsti.
de Deo, p. 451.
[xlvii][xlvii] [22] “Deus non semper ex praescientia finem intendit.”—Armin.,
Antip., p. 667; Corv. ad Molin., cap. 5. sect. 5.
[xlviii][xlviii] [23] “Cum et pater tradiderit filium suum, et
ipse Christus corpus suum: et Judas dominum suum: cur in hac traditione Deus
est pius, et homo reus, nisi quia in re una quam fecerunt, causa non fuit una
propter quam fecerunt.”—Aug., Epist. 48.
[xlix][xlix] [24] “Deus non particulatim, vel singillatim
omnia videt, velut alternanter concepta, hinc illuc, inde huc, sed omnia videt
simul.”—Aug., lib. 15. de Trinit., cap. 14. “In scientia divina nullus est
discursus, sed omnia perfecte intelligit.”—Tho., p. q. 14, a. 7. c.
[l][l] [25] Tilen. Syntag. de Attrib. Dei, thes. 22;
Zanch. de Nat. Dei. Unumquodque quod est, dum est, necesse est, ut sit
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