The Necessity of the Atonement
by Francis Turretin (1623-1687)
The Priesthood of Christ, according to
the Apostle Paul and the types of the Jewish ritual, is divided into two parts:
the atonement which he made to divine justice, and his intercession in heaven,
(1 John 2: 2. Heb. 9: 12). The necessity of such an atonement, which is the
foundation of all practical piety and all Christian hopes, must therefore be
firmly established, and defended against the fiery darts of Satan, with which
it is attacked by innumerable adversaries.
Upon this subject, the opinions of divines
may be classed under three heads: 1. That of the Socinians, who I not only deny
that an atonement was made, but affirm that it was not at all necessary, since
God both could and would pardon sin, without any satisfaction made to his
justice. 2. That of those who distinguish between an absolute and a
hypothetical necessity; and in opposition to the Socinians maintain the latter,
while they deny the former. By a hypothetical necessity they mean that which
flows from the divine decree, God has decreed that an atonement is to be made,
therefore it is necessary. To this they also add a necessity of fitness; as the
commands-of God have 1 been transgressed, it is fit that satisfaction should be
made, that the transgressor may not pass with impunity. Yet they deny that it
was absolutely necessary, as God, they say, might have devised some other way
of pardon than through the medium of an atonement. This is the ground taken by
Augustine in his book on the Trinity. Some of the reformers who wrote before
the time of Socinus, adopt the opinions of that father. 3. That of those who
maintain its absolute necessity; affirming that God neither has willed, nor
could have willed to forgive sins, without a satisfaction made to his justice.
This, the common opinion of the orthodox, is our opinion.
Various errors are maintained on this
point, by our opponents. The removal of the grounds upon which they rest will
throw light upon the whole subject. They err in their views of the nature of
sin, for which a satisfaction is required; of the satisfaction itself; of the
character of God to whom it is to be rendered; and of Christ by whom it is
rendered.
1. Of sin, which renders us guilty, and
binds us over to punishment as hated of God. It may be viewed as a debt which
we are bound to pay to divine justice, in which sense the law is called "a
hand-writing," (Col 2:14) as a principle of enmity, whereby we hate God
and he becomes our enemy: as a crime against the government of the universe by
which, before God, the supreme governor and judge, we become deserving of
everlasting death and malediction. Whence, sinners are expressly called
"debtors," (Matt. 6:12); "enemies to God," both actively
and passively, (Col. 1:21); "and guilty before God," (Rom. 3:19.) We,
therefore, infer that three things were necessary in order to our redemption;
the payment of the debt contracted by sin., the appeasing of the divine wrath,
and the expiation of guilt.
2. From the preceding remarks, the -nature
of the satisfaction which sin requires may be easily perceived. That which we
are chiefly to attend to in sin being its criminality, satisfaction has
relation to the penalty enacted against it by the Supreme Judge.
But here we must attend to a twofold payment, which is noticed by jurists. One
which, by the very deed of payment, sets at liberty the debtor, and annuls the
obligation, whether the payment is made by the debtor in his own person, or by
a surety in his name. Another in which the bare fact of payment is not
sufficient to liberate the debtor, because, the payment is not precisely that
which is demanded in the obligation, but all equivalent. In this case, though
the creditor such payment, has a right to refuse the acceptance of yet if lie
admits it and esteems it a payment, it is a satisfaction. The former of these
takes place in a pecuniary, the latter in a penal debt. In a pecuniary transaction,
the fact of the payment of the sum due frees tile debtor, by whomsoever the
payment is made. Respect here is bad, not to the person paying but to the
payment only. Whence, the creditor, having been paid the full amount due, is
not said to have treated with indulgence the debtor, or to have forgiven the
debt. But in penal matters the case is different. The debt rewards not things,
but persons; not what is paid, so much as him who pays; i.e., that the
transgressor may be punished. For as the law demands individual personal
obedience, so it demands individual personal suffering. In order that the
guilty person may be released through an atonement made by another in his
stead, the governor or judge must pass a decree to that effect. That decree or
act of the judge is, in relation to the law, called relaxation, and in relation
to the debtor or guilty person., pardon; for his personal suffering is
dispensed with, and in its place a vicarious suffering accepted. But because,
in the subject under discussion, sin has not a relation to debt only, but also
to punishment, satisfaction is not of that kind, which by the act itself frees
the debtor. To effect this there must be an act of pardon passed by the Supreme
Judge, because that is not precisely paid, i.e., a personal enduring of the
penalty, which the law demands, but a vicarious suffering only. Hence we
discover how perfectly accordant remission and satisfaction are with each
other, notwithstanding the outcry made by the enemy respecting their supposed discrepancy.
Christ made the satisfaction in his life and at his death, and God, by
accepting this satisfaction, provides for remission. The satisfaction
respects Christ, from whom God demands a punishment, not numerically, but in
kind, the same with that which we owed. Pardon respects believers, who are
freed from punishment in their own persons, while a vicarious suffering is
accepted. Hence we see how admirably mercy is tempered with justice. Justice is
exercised against sin, and mercy towards the sinner; an atonement is made to
the divine justice by a surety, and God mercifully pardons us.
3. This reasoning is greatly fortified
from a consideration of the relations in which God stands to the sinner. He
may be viewed in a threefold relation: as the creditor; as the Lord and party
offended; and as the judge and ruler. But though both the former relations must
be attended to in this matter, yet the third is to be chiefly considered. God
here is not merely a creditor, who may at pleasure remit what is his due, nor
merely the party offended who may do as he will with his own claims without
injury to any one; but he is also a judge and rectoral governor, to whom alone
pertains the infliction of punishment upon offenders, and the power of
remitting the penal sanction of the law. This all jurists know belongs to the
chief magistrate alone. The creditor may demand his debt, and the party
offended reparation for the offence or indemnity for his loss; but the judge
alone has the power to compel payment, or exact punishment. Here lies the
capital error of our adversaries, who maintain that God is to be considered
merely in the light of a creditor, who is at liberty to exact or remit the
punishment at pleasure. It is however certain, that God sustains the character
of judge and ruler of the world, who has the rights of sovereignty to maintain,
and professes himself to be the guardian and avenger of his laws; and hence lie
possesses not only the claims of a creditor, which he might assert or remit at
pleasure, but also the right of government and of punishment, which is
naturally indispensable. We must, however, in the punishment itself,
distinguish accurately between the enforcing of the penalty, and the manner and
circumstances under which it is enforced, as they are things widely different.
Punishment may be viewed generally; and in this respect the right of Heaven to
inflict it is indispensable, being founded in the divine justice. If there be
such an attribute as justice belonging to God, then sin must have its due, which
is punishment. But as to the manner and circumstances of the punishment, the
case is altogether different. They are not essential to that attribute. They
are to be arranged according to his will and pleasure. It may seem fit to the
goodness of God that there should be, in relation to time, a delay of
punishment; in relation to degree, a mitigation of it; and in relation to
persons, a substitution. For although the person sinning deserves punishment
and might suffer it with the strictest justice, yet such punishment is not
necessarily indispensable. For reasons of great importance, it may be
transferred to a surety. In this sense, it is said by divines that sin is of
necessity punished impersonally, but every sinner is not therefore of necessity
to be punished personally. Through the singular mercy of God some may be
exempted from punishment, by the substitution of a surety in their stead.
But that we may conceive it possible for
God to do this, he must not be considered as an inferior judge appointed by
law. An officer of that character cannot remit anything of the rigour of the
law by transferring the punishment from the actual offender to another person.
God must be viewed in his true character, as a supreme judge who giveth account
of none of his matters, who will satisfy his justice by the punishment of sin,
and who, through his infinite wisdom and unspeakable mercy, determines to do
this in such a way as shall relax somewhat of the extreme rigour of punishment,
by admitting a substitute and letting the sinner go free. Hence we discover to
whom the atonement is to be made; whether to the devil, (as Socinus, with a
sneer, asks,) or to God, as sovereign judge. For as the devil is no more than
the servant of God, the keeper of the prison, who has no power over sinners,
unless by the just judgment of God, the atonement is not to be made to this
executor of the divine vengeance, but to the Supreme Ruler, who primarily and
principally holds them in durance. We may add, that it is a gratuitous and
false supposition, that in the suffering of punishment, there must be some
person to whom the punishment shall be rendered, as in a pecuniary debt. It is
sufficient that there is a judge, who may exact it in order to support the
majesty of the State, and maintain the order of the empire.
4. The person who makes the atonement is
here to be considered. As sin is to be viewed in the threefold light of debt,
enmity, and crime; and God in the threefold light of creditor, party offended,
and judge; so Christ must put on a threefold relation corresponding to all
these. He must sustain the character of a Surety, for the payment of the debt.
He must be a Mediator, a peace-maker, to take away the enmity of the parties
and reconcile us to God. He must be a Priest and victim, to substitute himself
in our room, and make atonement, by enduring the penal sanction of the law.
Again: that such an atonement may be made, two things are requisite: — 1. That the same nature which sins shall make restitution. 2.
That the consideration given must possess infinite value, in order to the
removal of the infinite demerit of sin.
In Christ, two natures were necessary for
the making of an atonement: a human nature, to stiffer, and a divine nature, to
give the requisite value to his sufferings. Moreover, we must demonstrate how
it is possible, in consistency with justice, to substitute an innocent person,
as Christ was. in our room; because such a substitution, at first view, appears
to be not only unusual, but also unjust. Though a substitution, which is common
in a pecuniary debt, rarely occurs in penal transactions — nay, is sometimes prohibited, as was the case among the Romans,
because no one is master of his own life, and because the commonwealth would
suffer loss in such cases
— yet it was not 'unknown among the
heathen. We have an example of it in Damon and Pythias; two intimate friends,
one of whom voluntarily entered himself bail for the other to Dionysius in a
capital cause. Curtius, Codrus, and Brutus devoted themselves for their
country. The right of punishing hostages, when princes fail in their promises,
has been recognized by all nations. Hence hostages are called anti-psukoi substitutes.
To this Paul alludes, when he says, (Rom. 5:7) "For a good man some would
even dare to die." The Holy Scriptures often give it support, not only
from the imputation of sin, by which one bears the punishment due to another,
but from the public use of sacrifices, in which the victim was substituted in
the place of the sinner and suffered death in his stead. Hence the imposition
of hands, and the confession of sins over the head of the victims.
But, that such a substitution may be made
without the slightest appearance of injustice, various conditions are requisite
in the substitute or surety, all which are found in Christ. 1. A common nature,
that sin may be punished in the same nature which is guilty, (Heb. 2:14). 2.
The consent of the will, that he should voluntarily take the burden upon
himself, (Heb. 10:9) —
"Lo, I come to do thy
will." 3. Power over his own life, so that he may rightfully determine
respecting it, (John, 10:18) — "No one taketh away
my life, but I lay it down of myself, for I have power to lay it down, and take
it up again." 4. The power of bearing the punishment due to us, and of
freeing both himself and us from the power of death; because, if he himself
could be holden of death, he could free no one from its dominion. That Christ
possesses this power, no one doubts. 5. Holiness and immaculate purity, that,
being polluted by no sin, he might not have to offer sacrifice for himself, but
for us only, (Heb. 7:26-27.)
Under these conditions, it was not unjust
for Christ to substitute himself in our room, while lie is righteous and we
unrighteous. By this act no injury is done to any one. Not to Christ, for he
voluntarily took the punishment upon himself, and had the right to decide
concerning his own life and death, and also power to raise himself from the
dead. Not to God the judge, for he willed and commanded it; nor to his natural
justice, for the Surety satisfied this by suffering the punishment which
demanded it. Not to the empire of the universe, by depriving an innocent person
of life, for Christ, freed from death, lives for evermore; or by the life of
the surviving sinner injuring the kingdom of God, for he is converted and made
holy by Christ. Not to the divine law, for its honour has been maintained by
the perfect fulfillment of all its demands, through the righteousness of the
Mediator; and, by our legal and mystical union, he becomes one with us, and we
one with him. Hence he may justly take upon him our sin and sorrows, and impart
to us his righteousness and blessings. So there is no abrogation of the law, no
derogation from its claims; as what we owed is transferred to the account of
Christ, to be paid by him.
These preliminary remarks we have thought
necessary, in order to the lucid discussion of the question concerning the
necessity of the atonement. We now proceed to inquire whether it was necessary
that Christ should satisfy for us, as well absolutely, in relation to the
divine justice, as hypothetically, on the ground of a divine decree: whether it
was absolutely necessary, in order to our salvation, that an atonement should
be made, God not having the power to pardon our sins without a satisfaction, or
whether it was rendered necessary only by the divine decree? The Socinians,
indeed, admit no kind of necessity. Some of the old divines, and some members
of the Reformed Church, contend for a hypothetical necessity only. They think
it sufficient for the refutation of the heretic. But we, with the great body of
the orthodox, contend for both. We do not urge a necessity simply natural, such
as that of fire to burn, which is in-voluntary, and admits of no modification
in its exercise. It is a moral and rational necessity for which we plead; one
which, as it flows from the holiness and justice of God, and cannot be
exercised any other way than freely and voluntarily, admits of various
modifications, provided there is no infringement of the natural rights of
Deity. That there is such a necessity, is evinced by many arguments.
1. The vindicatory justice of God. That
such an attribute is natural and essential to God, has been proved at large
elsewhere. This avenging justice belongs to God as a judge, and he can no more
dispense with it than he can cease to be a judge or deny himself; though, at
the same time, he exercises it freely. It does not consist in the exercise of a
gratuitous power, like mercy, by which, whether it be exercised or not, injustice
is done to no one. It is that attribute by which God gives to every one his
due, and from the exercise of which, when proper objects are presented, he can
no more abstain, than he can do what is unjust. This justice is the constant
will of punishing sinners, which in God cannot be inefficient, as his majesty
is supreme and his power infinite. And hence the infliction of punishment upon
the transgressor or his surety is inevitable. No objection to this can be drawn
from the liberty of God, for that is exercised only in matters of positive
enactment, not in such as are of natural right: nor from his mercy, because
that, while it may free the sinner from punishment, does not demand that sin
shall not be punished.
2. The nature of sin, which is a
moral evil and essentially opposed to holiness, forms another argument. The
connection between it and physical evil is natural and necessary. As physical
or penal evil cannot exist without moral evil, either personal or imputed, so
there cannot be moral evil without producing natural evil. Moral and physical
good, or holiness and happiness, are united together by the wisdom, as well as
by the goodness and justice of God; so that a good man must be happy, for
goodness is a part of the divine image. The wicked must be miserable, because
God is just; and this the rather, because when God gives blessings to the
righteous, he does it of his own bounty, without any merit on their part; but
when he punishes the sinner, he renders to him precisely what he has merited by
his sins.
3. The sanction of the Law, which
threatens death to the sinner, (Deut. 27:29, Gen. 2:17, Ez. 18:20, Rom. 1:18,
32, and 6:23). Since God is true and cannot lie, these threatenings must
necessarily be executed either upon the sinner, or upon some one in his stead.
In vain do our opponents reply, that the threatening is hypothetical, not
absolute, and may be relaxed by repentance. This is a gratuitous supposition.
That such a condition is either expressed or understood, neither has been nor
can be proved. Nay, as the penal sanction of the law is a part of the law
itself, which is natural and indispensable, this sanction must also be
immutable. With the judicial threatenings of the law, we must not confound
particular and economical comminations, or such as are paternal and
evangelical, which are denounced against men to recall them to repentance. Such
threatening's may be recalled in case of penitence. Of this kind were those
denounced against Hezekiah, (Isaiah 38) and against Nineveh, (Jon. 3).
4. The Preaching of the Gospel, which
announces the violent and painful death of the Mediator and Surety on the
cross, is another argument which power fully confirms the necessity of that
event. For we cannot believe that God would multiply sufferings unnecessarily.
His goodness and wisdom do not permit us to harbour an idea that the Father
could expose his most innocent and beloved Son to an excruciating and
ignominious death, without a necessity which admits of no relaxation. The only
necessity which can be possibly imagined here,, is that of making an atonement
to the divine justice for our sins. Every, one must perceive that it was
absolutely necessary. I know that our opponents affect to produce various other
reasons for the accursed death of the cross, such as to confirm Christ's
doctrine, and to set an example of all kinds of virtue, especially of charity
and constancy! But since Christ had confirmed his doctrines by numerous
stupendous miracles, and 11 through his life had given the most illustrious
examples of every human virtue, who could believe that God, for that one cause
alone, would expose his only begotten Son to such dire torments? Therefore,
without all doubt, there was another cause for that dispensation, to wit: a
regard for the honour of his justice. To this the Holy Spirit bears witness by
the Apostle Paul, (Rom. 3:5) who affirms that "God hath set forth Christ to
be a propitiation for our sins to declare his righteousness," which
was inexorable, and did not suffer our sins to be pardoned on any other terms,
than by the intervention of the death of Christ.
Again: if God was able and willing by his
word alone without any atonement to pardon our sins, why does the Apostle Paul
so often and emphatically refer our justification and salvation to the blood of
Christ? "We are justified- by the redemption which is in his
blood," (Rom. 3:24.) "We have redemption through his blood;
the remission of sins," (Eph. 1:7). "He hath reconciled all
things to himself by the blood of Christ," (Col. 1:20). Now there was
no need that his blood should be shed if remission depended solely upon the
divine will. On this supposition, the apostle would rashly and falsely affirm,
what he often Arms, that the blood of bulls and of goats, that is, the
sacrifices under the law, could not take away sins; and that the oblation of
Christ alone could If there was no need of any purgation, but penitence alone
was sufficient to take away sin, that is, the guilt of sin, without any
sacrifice, the apostle's assertion is groundless. What could be taken away
without any sacrifice at all, could surely be removed by legal sacrifices. If
the divine will alone is necessary, why is it that Paul never refers to it, but
always ascends to the nature of things, as when he asserts that it was
impossible for the blood of bulls to take away sins? Surely it must be because
sin is so hateful to God, that its stain can be washed away by nothing less
than the blood of the Son of God.
5. If there was no necessity that Christ
should die, the greatness of God's love in not sparing his own Son, but
delivering, him up for us all, which the apostle commends, will be not a little
diminished. If there was no obstacle on the part of justice, in the way of our
salvation, it would indeed have been great grace in God to have forgiven our
sins. But it would have fallen far short of that stupendous love which, though
justice inexorable stood in the way, removed, by means found in the treasures
of infinite wisdom, all impediments to our redemption, displaying a most
amiable harmony between justice and mercy. Nor can Christ be said to have
appeased the wrath of God, if he, without demanding any satisfaction, could by
a mere volition have laid aside his own wrath.
6. Finally, our opinion relative to the
necessity of an atonement does not, in the least, derogate from any of the
Divine Perfections. Not from God's absolute Power, because he can neither
deny himself nor any of his attributes, nor can he act in such a way as to give
the appearance of delighting in sin, by holding communion with the sinner. Not
from the Freedom of his Will, because he can will nothing contrary to his
justice and holiness, which would be injured should sin go unpunished. Not from
his boundless Mercy, for this is exercised towards the sinner, though punishment
is inflicted on the Surety. On the contrary, it makes a glorious display of the
most illustrious of the divine perfections: of his Holiness, on account of
which he can have no communion with the sinner, until, by an atonement, his
guilt is removed and his pollution purged; of his Justice, which inexorably
demands punishment of sin; of his Wisdom, in reconciling the respective claims
of justice and mercy; and of his Love, in not sparing his own Son in order that
he might spare us.